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Jack Tego said on August 10th, 2010 at 2:10 am    

This is interesting. I agree that the cultural models you describe above can be considered American, and I agree that it is plausible that having a Life Path is another such model.

However, I think that there are alternatives to a spiritual basis for such cultural phenomena.

For instance, what if behind the “trappings of ‘higher’ reasoning” there is simply irrational and emotional conviction? Assuming that there is this sentiment that life is holy, one could argue that the sense of something being preternaturally precious is generated by our capacity for emotion. Rather than “holiness” being objectively created by something external to us (God, in this case), “holiness” is instead a subjective assessment.

Related to this are your assumptions in the last paragraph that our sense of duty (which is the emotion that I think underlies that sense of being “supposed” to do something or “owe”-ing someone something) requires a “whom.” Just like the conviction that something is holy can be a subjective conclusion, the feeling of duty can also be generated in our brains, even if there’s no clear “to whom.” Our rational minds might note that duties are usually accompanied by “to whoms” (to parents, to family, to country), so we flail about looking for that “to whom,” but that doesn’t necessarily mean that there is one (again, God, as per your post).

In short, just because we “have a sense” and our efforts to understand that sense yield no rational explanations does not mean that we have to immediately jump to a spiritual conclusion. It is possible (and I would go so far as to say probable, given what cognitive psychology and neuroscience have taught us) that such feelings are simply that, feelings that don’t necessitate some ultimate external explanation. Much like déjà vu doesn’t actually indicate that something has really taken place before, however convincing it feels.

I should note that I do think it is likely that many American cultural models either have their historical roots in religious belief or were reinforced over time by religious conclusions. Here’s an analogous situation: the idea of “inalienable rights” is an outgrowth of natural law, which originated out of religious thought, for the most part. Yet even after mainstream Western jurisprudence discarded notions of natural law for positive law in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the cultural tradition of rights persisted, albeit with equally plausible alternative rationales for why we should have them. And perhaps such rationales were irrelevant, and the notion of rights was passed on simply because of cultural inertia, or the fact that the outcomes that came out of having a system of rights generally turned out okay in the West.

I think something similar has happened with cultural models. While the concept of God might have been a “Prime Mover” for them in a historical sense, it doesn’t necessarily follow that the concept continues to vitiate all instances of such cultural models in the present day. Sorry for the long comment, and thanks for the post–it certainly got me pondering!

Jason Patent said on August 12th, 2010 at 9:38 pm    

Jack,

Great set of comments! For the most part I think we’re in exact agreement. I must not have been clear that I am not proposing that there is a God out there, or anything objective at all. I completely agree with your statement:

Rather than “holiness” being objectively created by something external to us (God, in this case), “holiness” is instead a subjective assessment.

Cultural models are nothing more than emotions, “subjective assessments” and the like. And they’re shared, which is what makes them cultural models.

I also like your comments about natural law. My study was originally motivated by an interest in differences between notions of human rights in China and the U.S. Over the coming months I’ll take this on more directly.

The one place we may disagree is the “to whom” piece. Whether we call it rational or irrational, our understanding of debt and obligation must contain a “to whom” (real or imagined) in order to be coherent. (This comes out of the Frame Semantics portion of Cognitive Linguistics, the field I was trained in as a graduate student.)

Thank you, Jack, for taking the time and energy to engage in this discussion!

Jack Tego said on August 28th, 2010 at 11:04 am    

Ah, actually I had debated with myself about whether to include exactly that bit about duty not needing a “to whom.” I agree that my argument about an unfocused sense of duty is pretty weak. If there is a way to conceptualize duty without a target, I have yet to imagine it.

I think that what I might have been trying to get at was the possibility of duty occurring as a “spontaneous emotional state.” Take anger for instance, does getting angry require some sort of internal or external stimulus for the anger to actually arise? Or is it possible for someone to get angry for no reason at all? I think this is more of an empirical question, but what I was trying to do was analogize that question to the sense of duty. Say that whatever the linguistic rules, ultimately that sense of duty manifests itself as a particular state in the brain, and that’s what causes us to feel it. Well, if that sense of duty could be divorced from its stimuli, the to whom, then perhaps it could be a spontaneous emotional state. Again, that’s all just conjecture and stabbing at the dark. I’ll read up some on Frame Semantics, it sounds fascinating.

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